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REPLY ARGUMENT

I.

THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO SUE FOR THE REAL
ESTATE BROKER COMMISSION.

a.

Summary of Primary and Responsive Arguments.

In his opening brief, Schvaneveldt argued that the Plaintiffs lacked standing
to bring an action to enforce the FSBO agreement. Only a principal broker can
seek a real estate commission, and none of the Plaintiffs were or had been a
principal broker.
~

Indeed, a stranger to the transaction and the lawsuit, Dale

Quinlan, was the licensed broker and owner of the dba ReMax Elite (the only
enumerated party to the FSBO).

The issue of standing was raised early in the

proceedings, and thus Schvaneveldt argued that this issue should be reviewed for
correctness.
In response, the Plaintiffs begin by challenging the standard of review.
Because a portion of the evidence raised to support Schvaneveldt' s standing
argument was offered after trial, Plaintiffs argue that a JNOV post-trial standard of
review should be employed. Plaintiffs next contend that the assumed name statute
does not bar them from pursuing the action, and that any failure to comply with the
statute may still be cured.

Plaintiffs finally contend that their due process rights

would be violated were the Quinlan and Department of Commerce evidence relied
upon to deny standing.

1

b.

Tlie District Court's Standing Conclusion Should be Reviewed for
Correctness.

As noted, Plaintiffs contend that the evidence concemmg Quinlan's
ownership of the dba ReMax/Elite was raised, in part, post-trial, and thus is subject
to a heightened standard of review.

That argument fails.

The evidence

demonstrates that the acquisition of the dba by Still Standing Stables, LLC has
mooted the issue of whether Plaintiffs have standing. The matter is conclusively
resolved, inasmuch as Still Standing's acquisition of the dba indisputedly and
finally merges any standing that Plaintiffs may claim to purse the commission.
The acquisition of the dba is claimed by Plaintiffs to be somehow
inappropriate. However, the acquisition of a judgment or enforcement rights by
one entitled to enforce them is routine. See, e.g., Lamoreaux v. Black Diamond
Holdings, 2013 UT App 32, 122, 296 P.3d 780 (cited by Schvaneveldt in his brief
p. 39). The effect of such an acquisition is to effect a merger of the claimant with
the claimee, thus rendering further prosecution of the claim moot. There is nothing
inappropriate in Still Standing's acquisition of the dba. Indeed, to protect its
rights, Still Standing could be expected to do no less than acquire the dba if it was
available.

It is incorrect to employ a heightened standard of review on the

2

application of law to facts that moot an issue. Issues of mootness are reviewed for
correctness. Tillotson v. Meerkerk, 2015 UT App 142, 15, --- P.3d.

---.1

The proper standard of review on this issue is, therefore, correctness, either
@

under the standard of review for mootness or for standing in general. Jones v.

Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ~10, 154 P.3d 808. It is thus inappropriate to make the series
of inferences and leaps suggested by Plaintiffs in their discussion of the evidence
surrounding standing. It is also improper for Plaintiffs to criticize Schvaneveldt for
failing to raise the standing issue in trial testimony, since the district court had
already ruled against Schvaneveldt's attempts to challenge standing and the
assignments mooting the standing issue had not yet occurred. In this respect any
contention that the standing argument was abandoned, Response Brief p. 23, is
incorrect.

1 Plaintiffs

rely on Brown v. Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14, ~15, 228 P.3d 747,
a case dealing with agency review of an action where future injury was alleged in a
pleading. The Utah Supreme Court was very specific that it was addressing the
nature of future injury in the context of pleadings, and whether simply pleading a
future injury was sufficient to establish standing.
The court used limiting
language in its ruling, stating that it was addressing the proper standard of review
in "future injury cases." Brown ~19. This conclusion is bolstered by Brown's
express reliance on Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), a case in
which the Supreme Court of the United States clarified the standing requirements
for environmental litigants whose actual injury had not yet materialized.
This is not a future injury case. Schvaneveldt's injury--being subject to a
claim by one not authorized to bring it--is fully realized. The district court
acknowledged this by ruling at one point, in Schvaneveldt's favor, that Shea lacked
standing to claim a commission because Shea was not a broker. R. 1885.

3

c.

Plaintiffs Are Not, and Never Have Been, Compliant With the
Registered Nanie Statute.

Plaintiffs argue that Aspenwood did not need to properly register the ReMax
Elite dba since neither it nor Wing, who claims to be retired, conduct business any
longer. Plaintiffs' theory is that even though the dba needed to be registered to
conduct business, it did not need to be registered to collect a commission in court.
Moreover, they argue, as long as the dba was registered with someone (even
Quinlan or Still Standing, presumably), this was sufficient for technical
compliance with the statute.
Plaintiffs concede that they did not properly register and maintain the dba,
but that this failure was essentially excusable. They cite no case law for this, but
rather rely on a strained reading of the statute. It is impossible to reconcile this
view with the statute's clear intent. Citing to the Plaintiffs' notice-to-the-public
argument, it is difficult to see how the public is served by consulting a dba
registration pointing to someone wholly unrelated to whom they are doing
business. Expounding by analogy, if a consumer were doing business with a dba
Smith Chevrolet, which was registered to Hyundai Motor Corporation but was
actually operated by General Motors, the consumer is not properly served and
protected from deception.
Apart from the counterintuitive nature of Plaintiffs' argument, the record
demonstrates, through the Quinlan and other evidence, that the Plaintiffs' claimed
4

ownership of the dba through their purported transfer from Quinlan was void ab
initio. This in and of itself unhinges Plaintiffs' already overstretched argument for
compliance.
d.

The Registered Name Statute Does Not Allow the Plaintiffs to Now
"Cure" Their Failure to Comply.

Plaintiffs next attempt to create an environment in which they can cure their
noncompliance.

None of what they argue on this point comes from the record.

Rather, it is offered as a hypothetical future way forward.
~

As such, it is

inappropriate to raise it now before this Court. Moreover, Plaintiffs cite no cases
or other authority indicating that the statute authorizes the type of nunc pro tune
cure they advocate.
As for the substance of the Plaintiffs' arguments, they first question the
assignment to Still Standing, the legitimacy of which has already been established.
Supra pp. 2-3.

Adding to that discussion, it is appropriate under any reading of

the statute to have an entity or individual own a dba as long as they have a
common interest, and, accordingly, common responsibility to the consumer.
Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge this reality.
Plaintiffs then cite to ReMax corporate policy (again, not in the record)
prohibiting dbas using the ReMax name without corporate permission.
extrarecord contention should not be considered.

5

This

e.

Due Process is Not Violated When One is Denied Discovery When
One Wins at the Outset in a Summary Ruling.

Finally, Plaintiffs raise a series of policy and due process arguments
concerning the Quinlan evidence.

Plaintiffs make a glaring omission in their

contentions: they did not have an opportunity to test the evidence or to conduct
discovery because the district court dismissed the arguments on which the evidence
was based as a matter of law. One does not suffer a denial of due process when
one is granted the very relief one seeks.

II.

THE COMMISSION IS NOT OWED BECAUSE THE CONDITIONS
OF THE FSBO CONTRACT WERE NOT SATISFIED.
a.

Summary of Primary and Responsive Arguments.

Schvaneveldt' s second argument was that default of the seller was required
in order for a commission to be owing. There was no basis, as a matter of law, to
conclude that the seller had defaulted as a matter of law.

Moreover, if the

Plaintiffs only had to show that there was a ready, willing and able buyer, issues of
fact surrounding this standard prevented a conclusion as a matter of law that this
condition had been satisfied.
Plaintiffs argue in response that the FSBO only required one condition: that
Schvaneveldt accept an offer from the Buyer, with no dependence on subsequent
performance by buyer or seller. Plaintiffs rely on a Utah Supreme Court case,

Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, 94

6

P.3d 292, for their argument that a closing need not actually occur (and no
proceeds need exchange hands) for a commission to be paid. Plaintiffs contend
that the agreement here and that in Fairbourn were "slightly different," but not
-.i;

materially so.

The need to record closing documents and for the commission be

payable from proceeds of the sale did not, Plaintiffs argue, change the requiremep.t
that a commission be paid. They also argue that Schvaneveldt caused the sale to
fail by not providing a general warranty deed, and that the REPC called for

financing (not cash). They conclude that no issues of fact surrounded whether a
ready, willing and able buyer was produced, and therefore summary judgment was
properly granted.
b.

Plaintiffs Ignore the Crucial Language in the FSBO That Seller
Default Must Occur in Order for the Commission to be Due and
Owing.

Plaintiffs' argument purports to rely on the language of the FSBO and on
Fairbourn, but it largely ignores key contractual language, and how that language
~

distinguishes the contract in Fairbourn. Plaintiffs omit from their block quote of
the FSBO an important follow-on sentence:
"The Seller agrees that the Brokerage Fee shall be due and payable
from the proceeds of the Seller on the date of recording of closing
documents for the purchase or exchange of the Property by the Buyer
or anyone acting on the Buyer's behalf. If the sale or exchange is
prevented by default of the Seller the Brokerage Fee shall
immediately be due and payable to the Conipany."
R. 6351.

Schvaneveldt raised the requirement of seller default in his brief,
7

contending that it was not established as matter of law. Plaintiffs have ignored it,
instead simply rehashing the same argument they made below. They have also
erected a straw man, claiming that Schvaneveldt contends that payment of the
commission is absolutely conditioned upon closing and exchange of funds (a
condition weakened by Fairbourn). But Schvaneveldt does not contend that actual
closing and exchange of funds was required for the commission to be payable.
Rather, he has consistently maintained that Plaintiffs needed to demonstrate seller
default, something that in the court below, and in their response, they have failed to
do.
The contractual language requiring seller default is expressly clear. The
Utah Supreme Court in recent years has reiterated the principle that a contract is a
contract.

For example, in Commercial Real Estate Inv. v. Comcast of Utah II,

Inc., 2012 UT 49, iJiJ38-40, 285 P.3d 1193, the court reviewed a liquidated
damages clause. It refused to constiue that clause in a manner more strict than it
would construe other provisions of the contract.

The court refused to apply

different policy standards to different language within the same instrument.
Nothing in Fairbourn suggests that the court wquld treat this FSBO any
differently. The commission language in the FSBO is expressly conditioned on

8

seller default, language that was not in the Fairbourn contract. 2 Ignoring that
provision commits the very error eschewed by Plaintiffs-inconsistently giving
effect to some contractual provisions at the expense of others. And if there is any
@

ambiguity arising out of ensuring such uniform consistency, the ambiguity should
be resolved against Plaintiffs as the drafter of the FSBO under the doctrine of
contra proferentem.

c.

Plaintiffs Misstate the Materiality of the Need for the Transaction to
be Cash, and Ignore the Factual Disputes Surrounding that
Material Condition.

Plaintiffs argue that Schvaneveldt refused to pay the commission because he
believed the transaction was cash, and the cash nature of the transaction was not
fulfilled.

This misstates Schvaneveldt' s argument.

As noted already,

Schvaneveldt's true contention is that buyer's failing to close on the deal,
IJ

combined with the seller not being in default, prevented the conditions precedent
for commission payment from being fulfilled.
Plaintiffs compound their misstatement of Schvaneveldt's core contention
by claiming that the difference between a cash and financed transaction could not

Even if seller default were an implied, and not express, condition of the
commission's being payable, this would not change the analysis. This Court in the
lower Fairbourn ruling implied a condition that was left undisturbed by the Utah
Supreme Court on certiorari. If the Utah Supreme Court were really disposed to
reject the possibility of implied conditions in contracts, it would have so ruled.
2

9

be material.

This defies reason.

A cash transaction is far less fraught with

potential transactional impediments. This is why cash sales often fetch a lower
purchase price.3 In any event, the majority of points Plaintiffs raise with respect to
Schvaneveldt's expectation of a cash deal are jury arguments and are thus
inappropriate.

Plaintiffs have the burden at summary judgment to demonstrate

that there are no material issues of fact. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 110, 177
P.3d 600. Their narrative shows not only that they have not complied with that
burden; they have abandoned it.
d.

There Are Significant Fact Disputes Concerning Whether There
was a Seller Default, and Plaintiffs Misstate When Contending that
the District Court Ruled That Failure to Provide a General
Warranty Deed Constituted Seller Default. Insurance, not a Deed,
was the True Issue.

While the Plaintiffs at no time in their brief acknowledge or address the
requirement that seller default be a condition for commission payment, they finally
do obliquely discuss it when asserting the Schvaneveldt did indeed default.
Appellees' Brief p. 39. But Plaintiffs argument, again, missed the mark. They
contend that Schvaneveldt was obligated to provide a general warranty deed to

Plaintiffs' vision of suitcases of cash is naive. A "cash" transaction has nothing
to do with specie. Rather, it simply means that the buyer himself has in hand the
purchase funds, rather than needing to rely on third-party funding, with its
attendant transactional friction.
3
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comply with the REPC. Having failed to do so, they contend, amounted to seller
default.
This argument is incorrect, for two reasons. First, it confuses the notion of
~

marketable title with that of access. Schvaneveldt addressed this in detail in his
initial brief, and that a general warranty deed was not required in order to furnish
marketable title. Second, and more significant, Plaintiffs' attempt to bolster this
argument by citing to the district court falls flat because the court did not rule that
failure to provide a general warranty deed was a seller breach. Instead, it stated
that buyers had waived the general warranty deed condition. The district court
ruled that the true issue was whether the seller could provide insurance on access
to the property (it ruled that seller could not). R. 5049-50; R. 8384 pp. 72-73.
Thus, the Plaintiffs cannot rely on any ruling issued by the district court to support

:..;;

their argument.
Significantly, in their motion for summary judgment on this issue, Plaintiffs

..;j)

did not contend that failure to provide a general warranty deed was the basis for
seller default. R. 1511-23.

This argument has thus only come to fruition on

appeal, and is inconsistent both the district court's rulings and the Plaintiffs'
posture below. R. 1521 (to the question of whether the closing never occurred, or
that seller never breached, Plaintiffs' "response is 'So what?"'). The failure to
invoke the general warranty deed argument makes sense when considering that

11

there is nothing in the record reflecting any demand or objection from the buyer
concerning a general warranty deed, or to the escrow instructions. Buyer simply
missed the closing.
e.

Factual Issues Surrounded Whether Plaintiffs Provided a Ready,
Willing and Able Buyer.

Plaintiffs argue that they provided a ready, willing and able buyer, which
was sufficient to trigger the commission provision.

Plaintiffs ignore that the

contract imposed more than this requirement-it required that the Plaintiffs
demonstrate seller default. Setting this aside arguendo, however, Plaintiffs have
not addressed Schvaneveldt's point, made in his brief at pp. 47-50, that factual
issues surrounded whether the buyer was ready, willing and able to proceed. One
of the most striking examples of such disputed facts is that Still Standing Stables
contended that it never saw "TBD" in paragraph two of the REPC (a material
. terms concerning new loan money); Schvaneveldt contended that Shea modified
the REPC after the fact. R. 4290-99. No default could occur when the agreement
the seller was "agreeing" to was not what it saw.
When Plaintiffs they contend that there was "no dispute" surrounding
evidence introduced at trial that the buyer was ready, willing and able, they ignore
the fact that summary judgment on this issue had already been granted. Because
of this, evidence touching upon it could not be challenged at trial, even though

12

disputes concerning it were myriad. The true focus, then, must be on the factual
disputes surrounding the initial grant of summary judgment on the buyer's status.

III.

SCHYANEVELDT CANNOT BE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR
PAYMENT OF THE COMMISSION.

a.

Summary of Primary and Responsive Arguments.

Schvaneveldt' s final argument was that he could not be personally liable
under the FSBO because of the provisions of the Utah Limited Liability Act. Utah
Code Annot. § 48-2c-601. The requirements of the act, in conjunction with the
~

evidence adduced below, demonstrated that Schvaneveldt was acting in his
representative capacity, and is not personally liable for the commission.
Alternatively, Schvaneveldt argued that his tort claims against Shea and Wing
should be reinstated since the district court ruled that the buyers had waived the
access issue, thus opening the door for Schvaneveldt to demonstrate that tortious
conduct by Wing and Shea was the reason the sale failed. Also, Schvaneveldt
enumerated various other misconduct as a basis for tort claims against Wing and
Shea.
Plaintiffs argue in response that denial of summary judgment by the district

c.J .

court was proper, because Aspenwood was able to demonstrate that both the FSBO
and the REPC indicate that Schvaneveldt was acting in a personal, and not

..;;

repr~sentative, capacity. They also argue that Schvaneveldt failed to raise below
any argument that Still Standing Stables was liable under the contracts, instead
13

inviting his liability by failing to aggressively point to Still Standing as the liable
party.

Plaintiffs also argue that it was the jury, and not the trial court, that

determined Schvaneveldt's personal liability.

This, they argue, heightens the

standard of review. And even accepting that personal liability was determined as a
matter of law, Plaintiffs argue that the face of both contracts reflect Schvaneveldt,
and not Still Standing, as the contracting party.

Plaintiffs do not mention in this

argument the provisions of the LLC Act cited by Schvaneveldt, nor do they
mention that the FSBO expressly incorporates the seller's disclosures in paragraph
13. (Those disclosures identify the seller as the LLC, not Schvaneveldt). R. 3716.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Schvaneveldt has failed to show how Shea could have
caused any harm in tort, as the essential element of causation is missing. There can
be no causation because Schvaneveldt failed to provide a general warranty deed,
which, Plaintiffs contend, was the true reason the deal failed.
b.

The Utah Limited Liability Act Conclusively Establishes that
Schvaneveldt was Acting on Behalf of Still Standing Stables, LLC,
and not as an Individual. The District Court as a Matter of Law
Ruled Otherwise, a Decision Reviewed for Correctness.

The Plaintiffs raise the· issue of what ruling Schvaneveldt is truly appealing.
A denial of summary judgment is not appealable. Schvaneveldt agrees. He is
appealing the district court's ruling, as a matter of law, that Schvaneveldt signed
the REPC in his individual capacity.

The district court never specifically issued

an order using these exact words, but instructed the jury that Schvaneveldt was the
14

only person that could be contractually liable for the commission, if a commission
was indeed due and owing. The jury was presented with the issue that someone
was liable under the FSBO, and that a commission had been earned, but
~

Schvaneveldt at that point was the last man standing. R. 5382. This was a ruling
as a matter of law, reviewed for correctness.
In the substance of their argument, Plaintiffs focus solely on the contents of
the REPC and FSBO, with no effort made to rebut the other evidence Schvaneveldt
raised below indicating that he was acting on behalf of the LLC, 4 and no discussion
whatsoever of the crucial requirements imposed by the LLC act.

That act is

dispositive. It is especially dispositive in this context, where a district court did not
apply the act's presumptions (which can be rebutted only by evidence "clearly"
indicating otherwise, Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51,
~

1 40,

190 P.3d 1269), and

instead ruled as a matter of law that a member could be personally liable for an act
conducted in the name of the LLC. The presumptions of the act render material
any evidentiary dispute, whether they arise out of the face of the contracts or their
context. They also place the burden squarely on Plaintiffs to demonstrate personal
liability (and not the opposite, which is what was imposed by the district court). It
4

That evidence included Schvaneveldt not being permitted to explain the blank area after
his name on the REPC followed by the LLC address (suggesting that Shea whited out the
word "member"). R. 3241. Schvaneveldt also argued below that there were ten other
unlawful changes made to the REPC after it was signed. Compare R. 3230-34 with R.
3237-41.

15

was therefore error as a matter of law to conclude that Schvaneveldt was
personally liable. Such a conclusion fails to follow the act.
Pl8:intiffs attempt to distinguish Daines, supra p. 15 (cited by Schvaneveldt
in his brief) to support their position.

Their sole contention is that the LLC here

was not expressly identified as a party to the relevant contracts, whereas in Daines
there was some mention of the LLC so as to trigger the inference that the LLC was
the party and not the member signatory. This is a distinction without a difference.
Schvaneveldt has enumerated the indicia present in both the contracts and other
evidence to allow the exact same inference as required by both Daines and the
LLC act. Appellant's Brief pp. 52-53. Plaintiffs ignore these indicia. They then
further undercut their argument by citing corporate (not LLC) cases that predate

Daines and do not take into account the express provisions of the LLC act.
c.

Schvaneveldt did Not Fail To Raise Below the Issue of the LLC's
Liability.

Plaintiffs contend that Schvaneveldt failed to raise the protections of the
LLC act at trial by failing below to point to the finger at the LLC. This argument
proves too much, and actually supports Schvaneveldt' s argument that the district
court ruled on this issue as a matter of law (and that it was not somehow resolved
by the jury). Consistent with its ruling that Schvaneveldt was personally liable as a
matter of law, the district court prohibited Schvaneveldt from raising the issue of
whether the LLC was the true contracting party. Schvaneveldt attempted
16

repeatedly to raise the issue of the LLC's party status, and was repeatedly barred
from doing so by the district court. R. 8383 pp. 12, 20, 28; R. 8385 pp. 27-28;
Appellant's Brief pp. 50-53; see also Appellant's Brief pp. 18-22.
~

This same

evidence shows that he did not stipulate, as Plaintiffs contend, to dismiss the LLC.
Rather, he was barred from arguing otherwise. R. 8383 passim. As such, the jury,
presented with no other option, found Schvaneveldt liable.

Consequently,

Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Schvaneveldt invited error or failed to raise
the argument at trial.
d.

If Schvaneveldt is Not Dismiss From This Action, His Tort
Argunients Should be Alternatively Reinstated.

Plaintiffs argue that Shea and Wing could not have caused Schvaneveldt any
·tort damages because Schvaneveldt failed to provide the required general warranty
deed. Thus, Schvaneveldt was the reason that the sale failed, not Wing or Shea's
actions.

Schvaneveldt has shown, however, that Shea modified the transaction

documents, and that he was acting as the seller's agent in doing so. This created a
duty from Shea to Schvaneveldt. Moreover, as has already been argued, supra pp.
10-12, Schvaneveldt was not obligated to provide a general warranty deed under
...)

the obligations of the REPC. More significantly, Plaintiffs fail to address the fact
that sellers waived the access issues, a point expressly raised by Schvaneveldt in
his brief. Pp. 53-54.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in his opemng brief, Appellant
Schvaneveldt respectfully requests that the rulings of the district court on standing,
liability to pay the commission, and personal liability, be reversed.
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2015.

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

Karra J. Porter
·
Phillip E. Lowry
Attorneys for Appellant Chuck Schvaneveldt
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